Deterministic assessment of scenarios of actions of violators during the operation of small sized installation with ionizing radiation

Abstract

The presence of category I nuclear material in a small-sized ionizing installation poses a security risk that require a robust physical protection system. This study evaluates the effectiveness of a physical system for a hypothetical 10 MW(e) small modular reactor. The assessment is conducted using the Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) model. The study employed a deterministic approach. It focuses on the single most vulnerable path, comparing an initial scenario with an enhanced security scenario. The results revealed an increase in the probability of interruption by 11% and, thereby enhancing overall security and reducing the risks of unauthorized actions. Sensitivity analysis provided further validation of system robustness. Interruption probability remained high across varied response force times. These results indicate that continued assessment and enhancement of nuclear material at installations using ionizing radiation